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T
he industrial revolution of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries left in its wake
a large body of literature, both popular
and scholarly, arguing that technology
had wrought fundamental changes to
the labor market. Some argued that as
important as the steam engine and new machinery
were to this new economy, “mental steam power”
and “intellectual machinery”—the ability of workers
to interact with the new technologies—was of equal
or greater significance. Even as debate about that
earlier period continues more than one hundred
years later, a new debate—with interesting parallels
to that earlier discussion—has ensued about the
effect of computers and other information and com-
munications technology on the labor market.1
Developments in personal computers, for exam-
ple, led Time magazine to make the device its 1982
“Person of the Year” and argue that “the information
revolution . . . has arrived . . . bringing with it the
promise of dramatic changes in the way people live
and work, perhaps even in the way they think.
America will never be the same.” By the late 1980s
and early 1990s, labor market analysts were finding
it apparent that wage inequality had risen, and a
series of papers argued that these two develop-
ments—rapid technological change and rising wage
inequality—were related.2 These papers and the
large literature that followed have paved the way
for the virtually unanimous agreement among econ-
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omists that developments in computers and related
information technologies in the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s
have led to increased wage inequality. 
In the labor economics literature this consensus
view has become known as the “skill-biased techno-
logical change” (SBTC) hypothesis. Specifically, this
hypothesis is the view that a burst of new technolo-
gies led to an increased demand by employers for
highly skilled workers (who are more likely to use
computers) and that this increased demand led to
a rise in the wages of the highly skilled relative to
those of the less skilled and therefore an increase in
wage inequality.
In this paper, which is a substantially abridged
version of Card and DiNardo (2002), we reconsider
the evidence for the SBTC hypothesis. We focus con-
siderable attention on changes over time in overall
wage inequality and in the evolution of relative wages
of different groups of workers. In doing so, we con-
clude that despite the considerable attention this
view has received in the literature, SBTC falls far
short of unicausal explanation of the substantial
changes in the U.S. wage structure of the 1980s and
1990s. Indeed, although there have been substantial
changes in the wage structure in the last thirty
years, many of which are documented here, SBTC
by itself does not prove to be particularly helpful in
organizing or understandings these changes. Based
on the evidence, we conclude that it is time to re-
evaluate the case that SBTC offers a satisfactory46 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
their relative supply. Despite some problems of iden-
tification, there exists a “consensus” estimate of
σ ≈ 1.5 when the two skill groups are college and
high-school workers.5 This estimate implies, for
example, that a 10 percent increase in the relative
proportion of college-educated workers lowers the
relative wage of college-educated workers by 6.6 per-
cent. Since the relative proportion of highly edu-
cated workers has been rising throughout the past
several decades, the only way to explain a rise in
the relative wage of skilled workers (and hence a
rise in wage inequality) is through changes in the
technology parameters α or g.
Second, skill-biased changes in technology lead
to changes in wage inequality. A shift in the param-
eter A, or an equiproportional shift in gH and gL,
leaves the relative productivity of the two skill groups
unchanged and affects only the general level of
wages. SBTC involves either an increase in α or an
increase in gH relative to gL. A rise in α raises the mar-
ginal productivity of skilled workers and at the same
time lowers the marginal productivity of unskilled
workers. This type of technological change has been
referred to as “extensive” SBTC; Johnson (1997)
gives as an example of extensive SBTC the introduc-
tion of robotics in manufacturing. The other situation,
sometimes referred to as “intensive” SBTC, arises
when technological change enhances the marginal
productivity of skilled workers without necessarily
lowering the marginal product of unskilled workers.6
Technology or Tautology?
A
s has been observed, in this framework SBTC
can be defined to exist whenever changes in
relative wages are not inversely related to changes
in relative supply. Indeed, the test for SBTC pro-
posed by Katz and Murphy (1992) is a multifactor
version of this point. Given a priori qualitative or
quantitative evidence on how different skill groups
are affected by changes in technology, however, the
SBTC hypothesis can be tested using data on rela-
tive wages and relative labor supplies of different
education/age groups, and we proceed to do so in a
number of ways.
Aggregate trends in technology. A first task in
making the SBTC hypothesis testable is to quantify
the pace of technological change. The most widely
cited source of SBTC in the 1980s and 1990s is the
personal computer (PC) and related technologies,
including the Internet. Chart 1 presents a timeline of
key events associated with the development of per-
sonal computers, plotted with two simple measures
of the extent of computer-related technological
change. Although electronic computing devices were
explanation for the rise in U.S. wage inequality in
the last quarter of the twentieth century.
An Empirical Framework for Understanding SBTC
T
here are many theoretical versions of skill-
biased technological change. To help fix ideas,
this paper focuses on a simple SBTC formulation,
versions of which have helped guide the large
empirical literature in labor economics.3 Assume
that aggregate labor demand is generated by a con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function of the form
(1) Y = f(NH, NL) = A [α(gH NH )(σ–1)/σ
+ (1 – α) (gL NL )(σ–1)/σ] σ/(σ–1),
where Y represents the value of output; NH repre-
sents the labor input (employment or hours) of high-
skilled workers; HL represents the input of low-
skilled labor; σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between the labor inputs; and A, α, gH, and gL are
technological parameters that can vary over time.4 In
many empirical applications NH is measured by the
number of college graduates (or “college-equivalent”
workers), and NL is measured by the number of
high-school graduates (or “high-school-equivalent”
workers.) For given values of the technology param-
eters, the relative demand for high-skilled labor is
determined by setting the ratio of the marginal
product of the two groups equal to the ratio of their
wages,  wH/wL. Taking logarithms of the resulting
expression and first-differencing over time leads to
a simple expression that has been widely used to
discuss the evolution of relative wages:
(2) ∆log[wH/wL] = ∆log[α/(1 – α)] 
+ (σ – 1)/σ∆log[gH/gL] – 1/σ∆log[NH/NL].
The equation is assumed to hold true for every
time period (typically a year). If the relative supply
of the two skill groups is taken as exogenous, this
equation completely determines the evolution of
relative wages over time. The technological param-
eters cannot be observed directly but are often
inferred by making some assumptions about how
they evolve over time. From equation 2, two obser-
vations follow directly.
First, changes in relative wages must reflect either
changes in relative supplies or changes in technology.
Other features of the labor market that potentially
affect relative wages (such as the presence of unions,
institutional wage floors, etc.) are essentially ignored.
In the absence of technological change, the relative
wage of high-skilled workers varies directly with1. See Berg and Hudson (1992) and Crafts and Harley (1992) for two very different views of the industrial revolution.
2. See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992); Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993); Levy and Murnane (1992); and Katz and
Murphy (1992).
3. See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992); Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998).
For a more complete discussion, see the longer version in Card and DiNardo (2002).
4. This model can be easily extended to include capital or other inputs provided that labor inputs are separable and enter the
aggregate production function through a subproduction function like equation 1.
5. See Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor and Katz (1999).
6. Note that it is necessary to assume σ > 1 in order for a rise in gH relative to gL to increase the relative wage of skilled workers.
The distinction between the four parameters (A, α, gH, gL) is somewhat artificial because one can always rewrite the produc-
tion function as Y = [cHNH
(σ–1)/σ + cLNL
(σ–1)/σ]σ/(σ–1) by suitable definition of the constants cH and cL. The relevant question is
how the pair (cH, cL) evolves over time. 
7. This distinction is emphasized by Bresnahan (1999) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).
8. See Hobbes’ Internet Timeline at www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline.
9. The World-Wide Web was invented at CERN (the European Laboratory for Particle Physics) in 1989–90.
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developed during World War II, and the Apple II was
released in 1977, many observers date the beginning
of the computer revolution to the introduction of the
IBM-PC in 1981. This development was followed by
the IBM-XT (the first PC with built-in disk storage) in
1982 and the IBM-AT in 1984. As late as 1989, most
personal computers used Microsoft’s disk operating
system (DOS). More advanced graphical-interface
operating systems gained widespread use only with
the introduction of Windows 3.1 in 1990. 
Some analysts have drawn a sharp distinction
between stand-alone computing tasks (such as word-
processing or database analysis) and organization-
related tasks (such as inventory control, supply-chain
integration, and internet commerce) and argue that
innovations in the latter domain are the major source
of SBTC.7 This reasoning suggests that the evolu-
tion of network technologies is at least as important
as the development of personal computer technol-
ogy. The first network of mainframe computers (the
ARPANET) began in 1970 and had expanded to
about 1,000 host machines by 1984.8 In the mid-
1980s the National Science Foundation laid the
backbone for the modern Internet by establishing
NSFNET. Commercial restrictions on the use of the
Internet were lifted in 1991, and the first U.S. site
on the World-Wide Web was launched in December
1991.9 Use of the Internet grew very rapidly after
Share of IT in GDP (left scale)
































































































Measures of Technological Change
Source: Jorgenson (2001) and authors’ analysis of October Current Population Survey, various years48 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
using a computer in 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997.11
Rates of on-the-job computer use, like the IT output
share, show substantial growth over the past two
decades—from 25 percent in 1984, to 37 percent in
1989, and to 50 percent in 1997. Nevertheless, the
fact that one-quarter of workers were using com-
puters on the job in 1984 suggests that some of the
impact of computerization on the workforce pre-
ceded the diffusion of personal computers. Indeed,
Bresnahan (1999) has estimated that as early as 1971
one-third of U.S. workers were employed in establish-
ments with mainframe computer access. Specialized
word-processing machines that predated the per-
sonal computer were also widely in use in the early
1980s. The absence of systematic data prior to 1984
makes it hard to know whether computer use
expanded more quickly in the early 1980s than in
the late 1970s or the late 1980s, which in turn makes
it difficult to compare changes in the rate of computer
use with changes in wage inequality, especially in
the critical early years of the 1980s.12
While none of the available indicators of techno-
logical change is ideal, all of the indicators suggest
that IT-related technological change has been going
on since at least the 1970s and has continued
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, some
evidence (based on the size of the IT sector, the
pace of innovations associated with the Internet,
and aggregate productivity growth) suggests that
the rate of technological change accelerated in the
1990s relative to the 1980s. 
Whose productivity was raised by recent
changes in technology? The second task in devel-
oping an empirically testable version of the SBTC
hypothesis is to specify which skill groups have
their relative productivity raised by SBTC. There
are two main approaches to this issue. The first,
articulated by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), is
to assume that groups that are more likely to use
computers have skills that are more complementary
with computers and experience bigger gains in pro-
ductivity with continuing innovations in computer
technology.13 We refer to this as the “computer-
use/skill-complementarity” view of SBTC. An alter-
native, advanced by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991,
1993), is to assume that recent technological changes
have raised the relative productivity of more highly
skilled workers along every dimension of skill,
leading to an expansion of the wage differentials
between groups.14 We refer to this as the “rising-
skill-price” hypothesis. As it turns out, the two
approaches yield similar implications for compar-
isons across some dimensions of the wage structure
but different implications for others. Throughout,
the introduction of Netscape’s Navigator program in
1994: The number of Internet hosts rose from about
one million in 1992, to twenty million in 1997, and
to one hundred million in 2000.
Qualitative information on the pace of technolog-
ical change is potentially helpful in drawing connec-
tions between specific innovations and changes in
wage inequality. For example, the sharp rise in wage
inequality between 1980 and 1985 (discussed below)
points to technological innovations that occurred
very early in the computer revolution (around the
time of the original IBM-PC) as the key skill-biased
events. By comparison, innovations associated with
the growth of the Internet presumably had very lim-
ited impact until the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, com-
parisons of relative timing are subject to substantial
leeway in interpretation, depending on lags in the
adoption of new technologies.
An alternative approach is to attempt to quantify
recent technological changes by measuring the rel-
ative size of the information technology (IT) sector
in the overall economy. One such measure, taken
from Jorgenson (2001), is plotted in Chart 1. Not-
withstanding the obvious difficulties with the inter-
pretation of such a simplified measure by a fairly
broad measure—IT output as a percentage of total
gross domestic product—information technology
has grown steadily in importance since 1948, with
sustained growth over the past two decades and a
pronounced upsurge in the late 1990s.10 The rapid
expansion of the IT sector in the late 1990s has
attracted much attention, in part because aggregate
productivity growth rates also surged between 1995
and 2000. Many analysts (including Basu, Fernald,
and Shapiro 2001) have argued that this was the
result of an intensive burst of technological change
in the mid- to late 1990s.
A third approach, pioneered by Krueger (1993),
is to measure the pace of computer-related techno-
logical change by the fraction of workers who use a
computer on the job. The thin black line in Chart 1
plots the overall fraction of workers who reported
While some of the early rise in inequality may
have been due to rapid technological change,
we suspect that the increase in the early 1980s
is largely explained by other plausible—albeit
relatively mundane—factors.10. See Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Gordon (2000) for interesting discussions of some of these issues.
11. These data are based on responses to questions in the October Current Population Surveys for workers estimated to be out
of school. See Card and DiNardo (2002) for details.
12. Card and DiNardo (2002), using data from the Information Technology Industry (ITI) Council on annual shipments of dif-
ferent types of computers since 1975, find that series constructed from this data show fairly steady growth in shipments
from 1975 to 1984.
13. Note that this hypothesis does not necessarily imply that individuals who use computers will be paid more or less than peo-
ple in the same skill group who do not.
14. To be slightly more formal, assume that the log of the real wage of individual i in period t (wit) is a linear function of a sin-
gle index of individual ability ai = xiβ + ui, where xi is a set of observed characteristics and ui represents unobserved char-
acteristics. Then log(wit) = ptai = xi(ptβ) + ptui, where pt is the economywide “price” of skill. Skill-biased technological
change in the rising-skill-price view is merely an increase over time in pt. 
15. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) argued that blacks tend to have lower levels of unobserved ability characteristics and that
rising returns to these characteristics held down relative wages for blacks in the 1980s.
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we will refer to either version or both versions of
SBTC as appropriate.
To set the stage, the table on page 50 shows pat-
terns of relative computer use on the job by differ-
ent skill groups in 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997. Rates
of computer use tend to be higher for those with
more schooling. High-school graduates are three to
four times more likely to use computers on the job
than dropouts, and college graduates are about
twice as likely to use computers as those with only a
high-school diploma. Interestingly, although overall
computer use rates have risen, the relative usage
rates of different education groups have remained
fairly stable. Since the wage differentials between
education groups are bigger today than at the start
of the 1970s, this fact would appear to be consistent
with the computer-use/skill-complementarity view.
Moreover, since better-educated workers earn higher
wages, an increase in the wage differential between
the highly and less highly educated is also consis-
tent with the rising-skill-price view of SBTC.
The data in the table also show that women are
more likely to use computers at work than men, and
blacks are less likely to use computers than whites.
Although the gender and race gaps closed slightly in
the early 1990s, the male-female and black-white
gaps remain relatively large. To the extent that
complementarity with computer-based technologies
is measured by computer use rates, these patterns
suggest that recent technological changes should
have led to upward pressure on women’s wages rel-
ative to men’s and downward pressure on black
workers’ wages relative to whites’. In the case of the
race differential, the relative wage approach to
gauging the impact of SBTC leads to a similar con-
clusion.15 In the case of the gender differential,
however, the two methods are inconsistent. Women
earn less than men and, as with the racial wage gap,
part of the gender gap is usually attributed to dif-
ferences in unobserved skills. Thus, the argument
that recent technological changes have raised the
relative productivity of more highly paid workers—
the rising-skill-price view of SBTC—suggests that
computer technology should have led to a widening
of the male-female wage gap.
Simple tabulations of computer use rates by edu-
cation and gender hide an important interaction
between these two factors, however. The education
gradient in computer use is much bigger for men
than women while differences in computer use by
gender are much smaller for better-educated work-
ers. Indeed, as shown in the table, college-educated
men are more likely to use a computer than college-
educated women. To the extent that computer use
indexes the relative degree of complementarity
with new technology, as assumed by the computer-
use/skill-complementarity version of SBTC, computer
technology should have widened gender differen-
tials for the most highly educated and narrowed
them for the least educated. By contrast, since men
earn more than women at all educational levels, the
rising-skill-price view of SBTC suggests that the
gender gap should have expanded at all educational
levels. Although the data are not reported in the
table, we have also examined the interactions
between gender and race. Compared to the interac-
tion between education and gender, however, the
race-gender interactions are relatively modest.
Finally, an examination of computer use rates by
age suggests that computer use has expanded
slightly faster for older workers than for younger
workers. As shown in more detail in Card and DiNardo
(2002), computer use rates in the early 1980s were
declining slightly with age. By the late 1990s, how-
ever, the age profile of computer use was rising
slightly between the ages of twenty and forty-five
and declining after age fifty. These observations sug-
gest another divergence between the two versions
of SBTC. Based on the age profiles of computer use,
SBTC may have led to a reduction in older workers’50 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
developments in the wage structure that are poten-
tially consistent with SBTC but appear to be driven
by other causes. 
Trends in Overall Wage Inequality
A
lthough measurement of wage inequality is
substantially more straightforward than the
measurement of technological change, there are a
number of potentially important issues. The Current
Population Survey (CPS) that is the most widely
relative wages. On the other hand, since older workers
earn more than younger workers, the rising-skill-price
view of SBTC predicts a rise in age- or experience-
related wage premiums over the 1980s and 1990s.
In what follows, we briefly review some impor-
tant changes in wage inequality and in the wage
structure. Throughout we will discuss both prob-
lems and puzzles for SBTC. The problems are facts
that seem superficially inconsistent with both (either)
version of the theory; the puzzles are important
1984 1989 1993 1997
All workers 24.5 36.8 46.0 49.9
By education
Dropouts 4.8 7.4 8.9 11.3
High school 19.8 29.2 34.0 36.1
Some college 31.9 46.4 53.5 56.3
College (or more) 41.5 57.9 69.1 75.2
High school/college  47.7 50.5 49.1 48.1
By gender
Men 21.1 31.6 40.3 44.1
Women 29.0 43.2 52.7 56.7
Male/female 73.0 73.2 76.5 77.8
By gender and education
High-school men 12.9 20.1 24.1 26.8
College men 42.7 58.8 70.5 75.5
High-school women 27.5 39.2 45.1 46.8
College women 39.6 56.6 67.4 74.7
High school/college (men) 30.2 34.2 34.2 35.5
High school/college (women) 69.4 69.3 66.9 62.7
Male/female (high school) 46.9 51.3 53.4 58.3
Male/female (college) 107.8 103.9 104.5 101.1
By race
Whites 25.3 37.9 47.3 51.3
Blacks 18.2 27.2 36.2 39.9
Other 23.7 36.0 42.3 48.2
Black/white 72.1 71.7 76.7 77.7
By age
Under 30 24.7 34.9 41.4 44.5
30–39 29.5 42.0 50.5 53.8
40–49 24.6 40.6 51.3 54.9
50 and older 17.6 27.6 38.6 45.3
Notes: Entries display percentage of employed individuals who answer that they “directly use a computer at work” in the October Current
Population Survey (CPS) Computer Use Supplements. Samples include all workers with at least one year of potential experience. College
workers include those with a college degree or higher education. All tabulations are weighted by CPS sample weights.
TABLE 
Use of Computers at Work (Percent)16. Card and DiNardo (2002) discuss at length issues of measurement and the robustness of the findings to alternative data
sources and measurement methodologies.
17. Here and in what follows, we refer to the data derived from the March supplement to the CPS as the March CPS and the
data from the Outgoing Rotation Group files and the 1973–78 May supplements as the OGR and May CPS data, respectively.
See Card and DiNardo (2002) for more details.
18. See Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (2001, table 2.17). For details on this and all other aspects of the data, see Card and
DiNardo (2002).
19. Similarly, the standard deviation of log wages for all full-time workers (men and women) was slightly lower in 1980 than in 1967.
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used source for data on individual wages (and the
source we use here), for instance, experienced a sub-
stantial redesign in the mid-1990s that appears to
have raised measured inequality. Nonetheless, our
most important findings appear robust to choice of
data sets and a variety of different methodologies
for the measurement of inequality.16
Chart 2 plots three different measures of aggre-
gate wage dispersion. The first is the standard devi-
ation of log annual earnings for full-time full-year
(FTFY) male workers, constructed from March CPS
data from 1968 to 2001.17 The second is the normal-
ized 90-10 log wage gap in hourly earnings, based on
the May CPS files for 1973 to 1978 and the OGR files
from 1979 onward. This series is based on estimates
constructed by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI),
using procedures very similar to ours.18 The third is
the standard deviation of log hourly wages for all
workers in the March CPS files from 1976 to 2001,
weighted by the hours worked in the previous year.
An examination of the chart suggests that the
recent history of U.S. wage inequality can be divided
into three episodes. During the late 1960s and 1970s,
aggregate wage inequality was relatively constant.
The standard deviation of log wages for FTFY men
rose by only 0.01 between 1967 and 1980 (from 0.51
to 0.52).19 Wage inequality measures from the May
CPS/OGR series also show relative stability (or even
a slight decline) between 1973 and 1980 while the
hours-weighted standard deviation of log hourly
wages for all workers in the March CPS was stable
from 1975 to 1980. The 1980s was a period of
expanding inequality, with most of the rise occur-
ring early in the decade. Among FTFY men, for
example, 85 percent of the 10-point rise in the stan-
dard deviation of log wages between 1980 and 1989
occurred before 1985. Finally, in the late 1980s
wage inequality appears to have stabilized. Indeed,
none of the three series in Chart 2 shows a notice-



















































Standard deviation log hourly
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Normalized 90-10 wage 
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Standard deviation log annual
earnings, FTFY men (March)
CHART 2
Alternative Measures of Aggregate Wage Inequality
Source: Authors’ analysis of March, May, and Outgoing Rotation Group files from monthly Current Population Survey and EPI52 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
trends in overall inequality and suggest three dis-
tinct episodes: the 1970s, when the college gap was
declining slightly; the 1980s, when the gap rose
quickly; and the 1990s, when the gap was stable or
rising slightly. For both men and women, the college/
high-school wage gap rose by about 0.15 log points
between 1980 and 1990. The rise for men was con-
centrated in the 1980–85 period while for women it
was more evenly distributed over the decade. The
similar overall rise in returns to college for men and
women is interesting, however, because as noted
earlier there is a much larger education gradient in
computer use rates for men than women. Based on
this fact, the computer-complementarity version of
the SBTC hypothesis would predict a larger rise in
the college/high-school wage gap for men than for
women during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other
hand, since the college/high-school wage gaps are
similar for men and women, the skill-price version
of SBTC predicts about the same rise in returns for
both. Thus, the similarity of the rise in the college
gap for men and women is a puzzle for one version
of the theory but not for the other. 
Some previous authors have argued that varia-
tion in the college/high-school wage premium can
be explained by a model like equation 2, with the
added assumption that the effect of changing tech-
nology follows a smooth trend (see, for example,
Freeman 1975 and Katz and Murphy 1992). In these
The apparent stability of aggregate wage inequal-
ity over the 1990s presents a potentially important
puzzle for the SBTC hypothesis, since there were
continuing advances in computer-related technology
throughout the decade that were arguably as skill
biased as the innovations in the early 1980s.
Another interesting feature of the series in Chart 2
is that the rise in wage inequality over the 1980s was
larger for FTFY men than for workers as a whole.
While the reasons for this are unclear, if viewed with
an eye toward SBTC, the relative rise in inequality
for FTFY men is a puzzle. To the extent that SBTC
tends to widen inequality across skill and ability
groups, we would expect to see a larger rise in
inequality for less homogeneous samples (for exam-
ple, pooled samples of men and women and full-
and part-time workers) and a smaller rise for
more homogeneous samples (such as FTFY men).
The data suggest the opposite.20
Components of the Wage Structure 
R
eturns to college. We now shift our focus to
specific dimensions of the wage structure. We
begin with wage differences by education, which
are at the core of the SBTC hypothesis. Chart 3 pre-
sents estimates of the college/high-school wage gap
by gender for the 1975–99 period, based on average
hourly earnings data from the March CPS.21 Trends














































College/High-School Wage Ratio by Gender, 1975–99
Source: Authors’ analysis of March Current Population Survey, various years20. As we explain in the longer version of this paper, although we prefer to measure aggregate wage inequality using the broad-
est possible sample of workers, the tradition in the inequality literature has been to analyze men and women separately
(although Lee 1999 and Fortin and Lemieux 2000 are important counterexamples). Treating men and women separately,
however, yields substantially the same conclusions for men. For women the trends in inequality are a little different although
they pose essentially the same problems for SBTC. For instance, whether the OGR or March data are used, it is clear that
most of the rise in gender-specific wage inequality, like the rise in overall inequality, was concentrated in the first half of the
1980s, with surprisingly little change in the 1990s.
21. These estimates are obtained from regression models fit separately by gender and year to samples of people with either
twelve or sixteen years of education. The models include a dummy for college education, a cubic in years of potential expe-
rience, and a dummy for nonwhite race. 
22. For example, a worker with fourteen years of education contributes one-half unit of college labor and one-half unit of high-
school labor while a worker with ten years of education contributes something less than one unit of high-school labor.
23. Indeed, a regression of the supply index on a linear trend and post-1982 trend interaction yields an R
2 of 0.997.
24. See Card and DiNardo (2002.) Beaudry and Green (2002) experiment with several variants of equation 2 and report sim-
ilar findings.
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studies the relative supply of college workers is esti-
mated by assigning various fractions of “college-
equivalent” and “high-school-equivalent” labor units
to workers in different education categories.22
Using a variant of this method, we derive such a
supply index, which is displayed in Chart 4. A fea-
ture of this index—which is revealing about a
potential problem with the SBTC hypothesis—is
that it follows a roughly constant trend between
1967 and 1982 (4.5 percent per year) and a slower
but again nearly constant trend after 1982 (2.0 per-
cent per year).23 Assuming that 1/σ is positive, shift-
ing trends in relative supply can potentially explain
an upward shift in the rate of growth of the college/
high-school wage gap in the early 1980s but not the
slowdown in the 1990s.
The problem is further revealed by comparing
estimates of models based on equation 2 that exclude
or include the 1990s. For example, augmenting the
model with a trend shift term that allows for a pos-
sible acceleration in SBTC after 1980, the estimate
of the relative supply term becomes wrong-signed,
and the model substantially overpredicts returns to
college in the late 1990s.24 We conclude that the
slowdown in the rate of growth in the return to
college in the 1990s is a problem for the SBTC
hypothesis that cannot be easily reconciled by shifts
in relative supply. 



































Log of college/high-school equivalents
CHART 4
Relative Supply of College-Educated Labor
Source: Authors’ analysis of the March Current Population Survey, various years. See Card and DiNardo (2002) for details.54 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
model that allows for imperfect substitution across
age groups is the presence of cohort effects in the
returns structure. Because education is (essentially)
fixed once a cohort enters the labor market, a cohort
with fewer highly educated workers will experience
higher relative returns at each age, leading to cohort-
specific deviations from the average pattern. Evidence
of such cohort effects is presented in Chart 5 (taken
from Card and Lemieux 2001), which shows the age
profiles of the college/high-school wage gap for five-
year age cohorts of men in five periods: 1960–76
(based on pooled data from the 1960 Census and
early CPS surveys), 1979–81, 1984–86, 1989–91, and
1994–96. In the 1960s and early 1970s the college/
high-school wage gap was an increasing and slightly
concave function of age, consistent with the func-
tional form posited by Mincer (1974). Subsequent
changes in the age structure of the college/high-
school gap, however, reveal a “twisting” of the age
profile—large increases in the gap at relatively young
ages during the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and
relatively small changes in the gap for older men.
Based on the data in Chart 5 and a series of formal
statistical tests, Card and Lemieux (2001) argue that
the trends in the college/high-school wage gap for
different age groups reflect systematically higher
college/high-school wage premiums received by suc-
cessive cohorts that have entered the labor market
since the late 1970s. Moreover, these cohort effects
Education and age. So far we have focused on
the average difference in wages between college and
high-school workers in all age groups. This focus arises
naturally out of a model such as the one described
by equations 1 and 2, where there are only two skill
groups—high and low education—and workers with
different years of labor market experience are treated
as perfect substitutes. In such a model, there is a
unique “return to education” in the economy as a
whole at any point in time. Moreover, the focus on
average returns to college is descriptively adequate
whenever the wage differentials between education
groups are the same for people with different ages or
different years of experience, as in Mincer’s (1974)
human capital earnings function.25
While the rise in the average wage gap between
college and high-school workers has been extensively
documented, the fact that the increases have been
very different for different age groups is less well
known. Specifically, the rise in the college/high-school
wage gap for men is most pronounced among young
workers entering the labor force after the late 1970s.
Moreover, the pattern of this increase does not appear
to be well explained by either the rising-skill-price or
computer-use/skill complementarity versions of SBTC.
One assumption embedded in equation 1 is that
workers with similar educations but different ages are
perfect substitutes in production. Card and Lemieux










































Changing Age Structure of the College/High-School Wage Gap
Source: Card and Lemieux (2001)25. The simplest way to justify Mincer’s formulation within the framework of the model in equation 1 is to assume that the rel-
ative efficiency units of different age groups depend only on experience (for example, age minus education) and that the
relative efficiency profile is the same for college and high-school labor.
26. An alternative data source on college graduates’ relative salaries in different fields, the Recent College Graduates Survey
(which is available only since 1977), shows similar patterns. See U.S. Department of Education (1998, supp. table 33-1).
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are highly correlated with cohort-specific changes
in the relative supply of college workers. Somewhat
surprisingly, after controlling for cohort-specific sup-
plies, they find that the return to education was about
the same in the mid-1990s as it had been in the mid-
1970s. This interpretation of the data leaves little or
no room for accelerating technical change; while
one could argue that the spread of computers led to
cohort-specific relative productivity gains for college-
educated workers, there is no direct evidence of such
a phenomenon. Moreover, the age profiles of the
college/high-school gap in computer use shifted uni-
formly between 1984 and 1997, rather than twisting
like the returns profiles in Chart 5.
Returns to different college degrees. One
concern with evidence for SBTC based on overall
wage differences between college and high-school
workers is that computer-related technology may
have had different effects on college graduates from
different fields of study. In particular, it seems plau-
sible that the computer revolution would lead to a
rise in the relative demand for college graduates
with more “technical” skills (like engineers and sci-
entists), especially in the early 1980s when micro-
computers were first introduced and the college/
high-school wage gap was expanding rapidly. Chart 6
displays mean starting salaries offered to graduating
students with bachelors degrees in various fields,
compiled from a survey of career placement offices
conducted by the National Association of Colleges
and Employers, and brings some evidence to bear
on this possibility.26 For convenience, we have scaled
the data to show mean salaries relative to humani-
ties and social sciences. The most obvious feature
of the data is that the relative salaries in more tech-
nical fields rose in the 1970s and fell in the 1980s.
This pattern is particularly true for the relative
salaries in the two fields most closely connected with
computers: computer science and electrical engi-
neering. Paradoxically, the introduction of micro-
computers was associated with a fall in the relative
salaries of specialized college graduates with the
strongest computer skills. Although the data in
Chart 6 cover only the period up to 1993, more
recent data suggest that in the late 1990s the rela-









































Mean Salary Offer Relative to Humanities/Social Sciences
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from National Association of Colleges and Employers56 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
1979 and later). Like overall inequality and returns
to college, trends in the male-female wage gap seem
to fall into three distinct episodes. During the 1970s,
the gender gap was relatively stable. During the
1980s and early 1990s the gap fell. Finally, in the mid-
to late-1990s the gap was stable again. Although the
different wage series give somewhat different esti-
mates of the size of the gender gap, all three show a
15 percentage point decline between 1980 and 1992.
Moreover, these trends are very similar for different
age and education groups.
These trends, and their similarity for different
age and education groups, pose a number of prob-
lems and puzzles for different versions of the SBTC
hypothesis. As noted earlier, the closing of the gen-
der gap in the 1980s is a particular problem for the
rising-skill-price version of SBTC, which predicts that
technological change raises the return to all differ-
ent kinds of skills, including the unobserved skills
that are usually hypothesized to explain the gender
gap. Since women use computers on the job more
than men, some observers have argued that the
decline in the gender wage gap is consistent with
the computer-use/skill-complementarity version of
SBTC.27 This theory cannot explain the similarity of
the trends in the gender gap for high-school and
college graduates, however, since college-educated
women are actually less likely to use a computer
than college-educated men. Thus, like Blau and Kahn
science graduates rose back to the levels of the late
1970s. Thus, the IT-sector boom in the late 1990s was
associated with a rise in relative wages of graduates
with computer-related skills. 
We regard the trends in the relative salaries of
college graduates in different fields as at least a
puzzle, if not a problem, for the SBTC hypothesis.
While innovations in computer technology do not
necessarily raise the relative demand for workers
with the most specialized computer training, engi-
neers and computer scientists have very high rates
of computer use and also earn higher wages than
other bachelor degree holders. Thus, the decline in
the wage premium for engineers and computer sci-
ence graduates over the 1980s is inconsistent with
either the computer-use/skill-complementarity or
rising-skill-price versions of the SBTC hypothesis.
Other Changes in the Structure of Wages
T
he male-female wage gap. One of the most
prominent changes in the U.S. wage structure
is the recent closing of the male-female gap. Chart 7
displays three estimates of the gap in wages between
men and women: the difference in mean log annual
earnings of full-time/full-year workers (based on
March CPS data); the difference in mean log aver-
age hourly earnings from the March CPS (for 1975
and later); and the difference in mean log average
hourly earnings from the OGR supplements (for

































1979 1991 1976 1982 1997
Hourly earnings, 
all workers (March)
Hourly earnings, all workers (OGR)
CHART 7
Male-Female Wage Gaps
Source: Authors’ analysis of March and May Current Population Survey, various years, and Outgoing Rotation Group files from monthly
Current Population Survey, various years27. For example, Weinberg (2000) argues that “since computer [jobs] are likely to be less physically demanding than the aver-
age noncomputer job, the elimination of noncomputer jobs in which men have a comparative advantage and the creation of
computer jobs in which women have a comparative advantage would tend to favor women.” 
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(1997), we conclude that the rise in women’s wages
relative to men’s wages over the 1980s must be
attributed to gender-specific factors. 
The black-white wage gap. Chart 8 shows the
evolution of another important dimension of wage
inequality—the difference in wages between white
and black workers. The chart shows the wage gaps
for full-time/full-year men and women (derived from
March CPS data) and for all men and women (based
on average hourly earnings from the OGR data).
The gaps for women are similar whether the data
are confined to FTFY workers or not while the gaps
for men are slightly different between FTFY workers
and all workers, at least in the early 1980s. As pre-
vious studies have documented, racial wage gaps
are also much smaller for women than for men. More
interesting from our perspective are the trends in
the racial wage gap, which are quite different from
the trends in other dimensions of inequality. During
the 1970s, when the gender gap and overall wage
inequality were relatively stable, the wage advantage
of white workers fell sharply: from 28 to 18 percent
for men and from 18 percent to 4 percent for women.
During the 1980s, when overall wage inequality was
rising and the gender gap was closing, the black-
white wage gap was relatively stable. Finally, over the
1990s, racial wage gaps were roughly constant. The
gaps for high-school and college-educated men and
women are similar to the corresponding gaps for all
education groups and follow roughly similar trends.
Like the gender wage gap, we view the evolution of
racial wage differences as at least a puzzle, and poten-
tially a problem, for SBTC. Both the rising-skill-price
view and the computer-use/skill-complementarity
view suggest that SBTC should have led to a widen-
ing of racial wage gaps in the 1980s. The gap in com-
puter use between blacks and whites is about the
same magnitude as the male-female gap, so the same
arguments that have been made about the effect of
computerization on male-female wage differences
would seem to apply to race. Indeed, Hamilton (1997)
argues that a computer skills gap contributed to an
increase in the wage differentials between whites and
blacks. In view of the data in Chart 8, however, it is
clear that other factors must have worked in the
opposite direction to offset any such effects of SBTC. 
Work experience. Along with education, gender,
and race, a fourth key dimension of wage inequality
in the U.S. labor market is age. Following Mincer











































Source: Authors’ analysis of March and May Current Population Survey, various years, and Outgoing Rotation Group files from monthly
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final issue worth discussing is the relationship
between SBTC and productivity growth. Many
analysts have noted that the pace of aggregate pro-
ductivity growth was stable during the 1980s and
early 1990s despite the introduction of computers and
the almost immediate effect that computerization is
presumed to have had on wage inequality.29 To illus-
trate, Chart 9 plots the log of real output per hour in
the nonfarm business sector of the United States over
the 1947–2000 period, along with a fitted trend line
that allows a productivity slowdown after 1975.30 The
rate of labor productivity growth during the 1980s
and early 1990s was substantially slower than in
1947–75. However, between 1979 and 1986, when
aggregate wage inequality was expanding rapidly,
productivity first fell relative to trend (during the 1980
and 1982–83 recessions), then recovered to its earlier
trend level. There is no indication that developments
in the early 1980s led to an unexpected change in the
productive capacity of the economy. 
We regard the absence of a link between SBTC
(as measured by the rate of increase in wage inequal-
ity) and aggregate productivity growth as a puzzle,
although not necessarily a problem, for SBTC. While
some theoretical discussions of technological change
assume that any new technology leads to an outward
shift in the economywide production frontier, some
specific versions of SBTC do not. Extensive SBTC—
a rise in the share parameter α in the aggregate
production function given in equation 1 that would
raise the productivity of some workers and lower
that of others—would be consistent with rising wage
inequality but not necessarily raising aggregate
labor productivity. Nonetheless, it is rather surpris-
ing that whatever shifts in technology led to the
rapid growth in inequality between 1980 and 1985
appeared to have no effect on the trend in aggre-
gate productivity. 
In comparison to the early 1980s, the late 1990s
may turn out to be a better example of a period of
rapid technologically driven output growth. As shown
in Chart 9, aggregate output growth was consider-
ably above trend in the 1998–2000 period. Moreover,
some (but not all) measures of wage inequality show
a rise after 1995 or 1996. Some detailed microlevel
analyses point to specific technology-related changes
in workplace organization that have a significant
impact on productivity (see, for example, Bresnahan,
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002). In view of the con-
founding effect of the extraordinary business cycle
assumption that log wages are a separable function
of education and potential labor market experience
(age minus education minus 6): In this framework,
if there is an increase in the return to skill caused
by changes in technology, we should expect the
return to an additional year of experience to rise. As
shown in more detail in Card and DiNardo (2002),
here too the evidence is not favorable for SBTC. For
example, there is little evidence of either a rise or
fall in the average return to experience over the
period 1979 to 1991 for high-school-educated men,
who make up about one-third of all male workers.
Much the same is true for younger college-educated
men (those between the ages of twenty-four and
thirty-seven who have two to fifteen years of poten-
tial experience), and for college-educated men in the
middle range of experience, the wage profile actually
became flatter over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Given this analysis of the change (or lack of
change) in men’s experience profile, it is difficult to
rationalize the somewhat different evolution of the
potential experience profile for women in an SBTC
framework. During the period 1979–91, experience
profiles did become somewhat steeper for both
high-school- and college-educated women, particu-
larly for women with between two and eighteen
years of potential experience. Manning (2001) has
shown that for women in the United Kingdom, where
the male-female wage gap also closed substantially
over the 1980s, a similar increase in the returns to
experience can be in part explained by a shift across
cohorts in the fraction of time spent working.28 How
far such an analysis could go toward explaining the
these shifts in the experience profile is an interest-
ing question. In any case, we suspect that SBTC has
little to do with the story.
Residual inequality. SBTC has also been pro-
posed as an explanation for the rise in inequality
among workers with similar observable characteris-
tics. To the extent that wage differences between
workers with the same education, age, gender, and
race reflect the labor market’s valuation of unmea-
sured productivity, the rising-skill-price version
of SBTC predicts a rise in the residual variance
associated with a standard human capital model of
wage determination while the prediction from the
computer-complimentarity version of SBTC is
unclear. As documented in Card and DiNardo (2002),
however, the trends in residual inequality pose
much the same difficulties as the trends in overall
inequality that we have documented here. In par-
ticular, we find that most of the modest rise in resid-
ual inequality was concentrated in the early 1980s,
which suggests that if SBTC is the cause for this28. To the extent that the measured potential experience profile reflects the relationship between wages and actual experience,
for example, such a shift in the labor force participation rates of women would cause a steepening of the wage/potential
experience profile. 
29. For example, in a 1996 statement Alan Greenspan observed that “the advent of the semiconductor, the microprocessor, the
computer, and the satellite . . . has puzzled many of us in that the growth of output as customarily measured has not evi-
denced a corresponding pickup” (quoted in McGuckin, Stiroh, and van Ark 1997). 
30. The productivity series is series PRS85006093, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, uploaded December 2001. The fitted
trend in the log of output per hour is 0.0262 in the period 1947–75 and 0.0139 in the period 1976–2000.
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conditions during the late 1990s, however, it may be




hat is one to make of recent trends in wage
inequality and productivity and the links (or
absence of links) to computer-related technology?
From the vantage point of an analyst looking at the
available data in the mid- to late 1980s, there were
many reasons to find skill-biased technological
change a plausible explanation for the large
increase in inequality that began in the early 1980s.
First and foremost, the timing seemed right. During
the 1970s, the college/high-school wage gap nar-
rowed. Richard Freeman’s 1976 book The Over-
educated American argued that the U.S. labor
market suffered from an oversupply of educated
workers. By 1985 the situation had clearly reversed,
and education-related wage gaps and other dimen-
sions of wage inequality were on the rise. At the
same time, the personal computer was making dra-
matic inroads into the workplace, the stock market
valuation of technology firms was rising, and arti-
cles in the business press were expounding the
effects of the new technology. Analysts in the late
1980s had no way of knowing that, although com-
puter use would continue to expand over the next
decade and the stock market value of technology
firms would rise, the increase in wage inequality
was largely over.
Viewed from 2002, the rise in wage inequality
now appears to have been an episodic event. Of the
17 percent rise in the 90-10 wage gap between 1979
and 1999 for all workers in the OGR wage series
(see Chart 2), 13 percentage points (or 76 percent)
occurred by 1984, the year that the IBM-AT was
introduced. While some of the early rise in inequality
may have been due to rapid technological change,










































Fitted trend, with post-1975 trend break
1979–86
CHART 9
Trends in Productivity per Hour, Nonfarm Business Sector
Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data (see footnote 30)60 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
Of course, neither this informal analysis nor the
more exhaustive study by Lee (1999) imply that the
minimum wage can explain all the changes in the
wage structure that occurred in the 1980s and
1990s. Indeed, we have documented several impor-
tant changes that cannot be explained by the mini-
mum wage, including the closing of the gender gap.31
Nevertheless, we suspect that trends in the mini-
mum wage and other factors such as declining union-
ization and the reallocation of labor caused by the
1982 recession can help to explain the rapid rise in
overall wage inequality in the early 1980s.
Overall, the evidence linking rising wage inequal-
ity to skill-biased technological change is surprisingly
weak. Moreover, we conjecture that a narrow focus
on technology has diverted attention away from many
interesting developments in the wage structure that
cannot be easily explained by skill-biased techno-
logical change. Perhaps the perspective of a new
decade will help to open the field of unexplained
variance to all players.
largely explained by other plausible—albeit relatively
mundane—factors. A primary candidate is the fall
in the real value of the minimum wage. In 1979 the
modal wage for women with a high-school education
was $2.90 an hour—the level of the federal mini-
mum wage (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996).
Over the next five years the consumer price index
rose by 48 percent while the minimum wage increased
by only 15 percent, leading to a steep decline in the
influence of the minimum wage on the lower tail of
the wage distribution. Chart 10 plots the real value
of the federal minimum wage between 1973 and
2000. Examination of this figure suggests that it is
nearly a mirror image of the inequality series in
Chart 2. Indeed, as shown in Chart 11, predictions
from a simple regression of the normalized 90-10
wage gap (from the May CPS and OGR data) on the
log of the real minimum wage track the actual wage
gap very closely. This simple model explains over
90 percent of the variation in the 90-10 wage gap







































Real Minimum Wage, 1973–2000
Source: Authors’ analysis. See also <www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.htm>.
31. Lee (1999) presents a detailed cross-state evaluation of the effect of the minimum wage on overall wage inequality and con-
cludes that the fall in the real minimum wage can explain nearly all the rise in aggregate inequality in the 1980s. That the
minimum wage explains most of the change in overall inequality, but cannot explain specific changes in the wage structure,
is not as puzzling as it might first appear. Fortin and Lemieux (1998, 2000) show that although the 1980s saw very large
increases in gender-specific wage inequality, changes in the overall distribution of wages were much smaller. Lee’s analysis
suggests that these are largely explainable by the minimum wage.61 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
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